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RETREATING FROM PLAIN VIEW:
TEXAS V. BROWN
N June 1979 Forth Worth police officer Harold Maples stopped the car
of Clifford James Brown shortly before midnight at a routine driver's
license checkpoint.' Standing next to the driver's window of the car,
Officer Maples asked Brown, the car's only occupant, for his driver's li-
cense. As Maples shined his flashlight into the car, Brown withdrew his
hand from his right pants pocket and the officer observed an opaque green
party balloon, knotted about one-half inch from the tip, caught between
Brown's fingers. Brown dropped the balloon on the seat beside his leg and
opened the glove compartment. In the lighted glove box Maples observed
several empty plastic vials, some loose white powder, and an open bag of
party balloons. After looking through the glove compartment, Brown in-
formed Maples that he had no driver's license. Maples told Brown to get
out of the car and stand at its rear. Brown complied, and Maples then
reached into the car and picked up the balloon, which appeared to contain
a powdery substance. Maples advised Brown that he was under arrest and
seized the balloon and other items from the car as evidence. After chemi-
cal tests determined that the powder in the balloon was heroin, Brown was
charged with possession of a controlled substance. 2 At a hearing to sup-
press the evidence found in the car, Officer Maples testified that his experi-
ence as an officer led him to suspect that the balloon contained narcotics. 3
The trial court denied the motion to suppress, and Brown was convicted
and sentenced to a term of four years in prison. The Texas Court of Crim-
inal Appeals reversed the conviction, 4 holding that the warrantless seizure
of the balloon did not fall within the plain view doctrine announced in
Coolidge v. New Hampshire.5 The United States Supreme Court granted
I. The purpose of the operation was to check for driver's licenses, current vehicle in-
spection stickers, and auto registration infractions. The officers were not checking for out-
standing warrants, nor had they been directed to look for specific persons or narcotics
violations. The officers stopped every vehicle that came through the checkpoint.
2. The crime was a felony of the second degree under the version of the Texas Con-
trolled Substance Act in effect in 1979. Ch. 429, §§ 4.02(b)(2)(J), 4.04(a)-(b)(l), 1973 Tex.
Gen. Laws 1132, 1148-49, 1154 (current version at TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4476-
15, §§ 4.02(b)(2)(K), 4.04(a)-(b) (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983)).
3. A police chemist also testified at the suppression hearing that similar balloons were
frequently submitted for analysis as containers for illegal substances.
4. Brown v. State, 617 S.W.2d 196 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981) (en banc).
5. 403 U.S. 443 (1971). The plain view doctrine, supported by four Justices in the
plurality opinion, requires that in order for a warrantless seizure of an object in plain view to
be lawful, the police must have made an initial valid intrusion, their sighting of the item
must have been inadvertent, and the incriminatory nature of the object must be immediately
apparent to them. Id. at 467-71. In Brown v. State, 617 S.W.2d 196 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981)
(en banc), the court determined that Officer Maples had to know that incriminatory evidence
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certiorari. Held, reversed and remanded: When a law enforcement officer
making a justified intrusion upon an individual's privacy inadvertently
comes upon an item in plain view, he may lawfully seize the object if he
has probable cause to associate the item with criminal activity. Texas v.
Brown, 103 S. Ct. 1535, 75 L. Ed. 2d 502 (1983).
I. THE CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS FOR THE REGULATION
OF POLICE PRACTICES
A. The Fourth Amendment
The issue of when an individual's right to privacy must yield to the gov-
ernment's interest in effective crime control has long perplexed the courts.
The fourth amendment of the United States Constitution 6 erects a consti-
tutional barrier that protects citizens from government overreaching. 7 It
guarantees a citizen's right to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures and describes the conditions under which a search warrant may
issue.8
The importance of the interpretation of fourth amendment requirements
in controlling law enforcement practices has heightened since the exclu-
sionary rule9 was made applicable to the states in Mapp v. Ohio. 1o Under
was present when he seized the balloon. Id at 200. The Brown search was not valid, the
court held, because the contents of the opaque balloon could not have been immediately
apparent to the officer. Id
6. The fourth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affir-
mation, and..particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
7. Ashdown, The Fourth Amendment and the "Legitimate Expectation of Privacy," 34
VAND. L. REV. 1289, 1289-90 (1981). The fourth amendment was a reaction to general
warrants and warrantless seizures that were prevalent in the American colonies. See Mar-
ron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196 (1927); J. HIRSCHEL, FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS
1 (1979). Its primary function today is to monitor and control police activities. Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 12 (1968); Ashdown, supra, at 1290 n.2.
8. The ambiguous wording of the fourth amendment has been responsible for a history
of apparently conflicting judicial interpretations of the amendment's protections. The lan-
guage of the amendment does not clarify the connection between a warrant and a reasonable
search. Nothing indicates that warrantless searches and seizures are inherently unreasona-
ble. 1 W. RINGEL, SEARCHES & SEIZURES, ARRESTS AND CONFESSIONS § 1.1, at 1-1 (1983);
see also Ashdown, supra note 7, at 1290 (lack of guidance from fourth amendment language
has caused erratic swings in its judicial interpretation).
9. The exclusionary rule, first applied in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914),
makes evidence secured in violation of the fourth amendment inadmissible at trial. As to
the significance of the exclusionary rule in fourth amendment law, see I W. RINGEL, supra
note 8, § 1.3, at 1-8; Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV.
349, 430-32 (1974); Moylan, The Plain View Doctrine.- Unexpected Child of the Great "Search
Incident" Geography Battle, 26 MERCER L. REV. 1047, 1050-51 (1975). See also I W.
RINGEL, supra note 8, § 1.5, at 1-18 (sole rationale of exclusionary rule is deterrence of
police misconduct); Ashdown, supra note 7, at 1292-93 (Burger Court's overly sympathetic
attitude toward law enforcement entities is result of its dissatisfaction with exclusionary
rule); Wingo, Growing Disillusionment with the Exclusionary Rule, 25 Sw. L.J. 573 (1971)(questioning excusionary rule rationale and suggesting alternatives). For an in-depth statis-
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the exclusionary rule, the admission or exclusion of evidence at trial de-
pends on the manner in which the evidence was obtained. The Supreme
Court has faced the task, therefore, of defining both the reasonableness of
searches and seizures and the situations in which a search warrant must be
obtained. Initially, the Court determined the reasonableness of a search or
seizure according to the degree to which a particular law enforcement
practice invaded an individual's property rights.'" In Katz v. United
States, 12 however, the Supreme Court altered the focus of fourth amend-
ment protection from property rights 13 to privacy interests. Stating that
"the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places," 14 the Court declared
a particular type of electronic eavesdropping by law enforcement officials' 5
unconstitutional as a warrantless search. 16 In his concurrence Justice
Harlan elaborated on the majority's opinion by defining the protected in-
terest as an actual expectation of privacy that society would recognize as
reasonable.' 7 The Katz rule, which is often referred to as the reasonable
expectation of privacy,' 8 requires courts to assess particular law enforce-
tical study of the effects of the exclusionary rule on law enforcement practices and a propo-
sal of alternatives to the rule, see S. SCHLESINGER, EXCLUSIONARY INJUSTICE: THE
PROBLEM OF ILLEGALLY OBTAINED EVIDENCE (1977).
10. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). Although the exclusionary rule, as a tool implementing fourth
amendment commands, became applicable to the states in Mapp, Justice Clark's majority
opinion made the questionable assumption that the Court had already incorporated the
fourth amendment protections against the arbitrary invasion of privacy by police into the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment in the earlier case of Wolf v. Colorado, 338
U.S. 25 (1949). Mapp, 367 U.S. at 655. Actually, Justice Frankfurter's majority opinion in
Wolf refused to impose the exclusionary rule on the states. 338 U.S. at 29. Frankfurter
acknowledged, however, that the protection of an individual's privacy from police intrusion
lies at the core of the fourth amendment and is basic to a free society. Id. at 27. The
sanctioning by the state of arbitrary incursion by police into an individual's privacy would
be a violation of the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 28. By joining Justice Harlan's vigorous
dissent in Mapp, Justice Frankfurter reiterated his view that the exclusionary rule should not
be made applicable to the states through the wholesale incorporation of the fourth amend-
ment into the fourteenth amendment. See Mapp, 367 U.S. at 679 (Harlan, J. dissenting).
I1. See, e.g., Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 134-35 (1942) (use of detecta-
phone upheld under fourth amendment because no trespass involved); Olmstead v. United
tates, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928) (evidence obtained through wiretapping upheld as admissi-
ble since no trespass on property or search of person involved); see also 2 W. LAFAVE,
SEARCH AND SEIZURE, A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 2.1, at 223-24 (1978)
(summary of cases leading to Katz v. United States).
12. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
13. Prior to Katz the concept of a fourth amendment search applied only to acts in
which police physically intruded into a "constitutionally protected area." Silverman v.
United States, 365 U.S. 505, 510 (1961). The protected areas were those enumerated in the
fourth amendment. This property-based conceptualization of a search had led the adversa-
ries in Katz, which concerned electronic surveillance of telephone calls, to argue over
whether a phone booth was a constitutionally protected area and whether a search could
have occurred without a physical intrusion. 389 U.S. at 349-50.
14. Id at 351.
15. Katz was suspected of transmitting wagering information by telephone across state
lines. FBI agents listened to Katz's end of the conversations by attaching an electronic lis-
tening and recording device to the outside of the phone booth Katz used.
16. Id at 359.
17. Id. at 361.
18. Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 104 (1980); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143
(1978); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968).
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ment practices by balancing their utility against the extent to which they
intrude on an individual's sense of security.' 9
The Supreme Court in Katz also emphasized the importance of the war-
rant requirement of the fourth amendment, stating that "searches con-
ducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or
magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment-sub-
ject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated excep-
tions."'20 Thus, under the Katz rule the reasonableness of a search depends
on whether it was executed pursuant to a properly obtained warrant 2' or
executed in a situation governed by an exception to the warrant clause.
These exceptions include the automobile exception, 22 the search incident
to lawful arrest,23 hot pursuit,24 the consent search,25 and the plain view
doctrine.26
B. The Plain View Doctrine
The Supreme Court first recognized the plain view doctrine27 as a sepa-
19. See United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 751-52 (1971). This balancing test, of
course, necessitates difficult value judgments on the part of the courts. The Katz decision
has nevertheless been applauded by some commentators as raising the proper issues in de-
termining whether the fourth amendment extends to a particular police practice. 2 W.
LAFAVE, supra note 11, § 2.1, at 231-34; Amsterdam, supra note 9, at 388.
20. 389 U.S. at 347 (footnotes omitted).
21. The minimum constitutional requirements for the issuance of a warrant are: (1) a
determination of probable cause; (2) an oath or affidavit in support of the showing of prob-
able cause; and (3) particularity of description in the warrant of the place to be searched and
the items or persons to be seized. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
22. The automobile exception was first recognized in Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S.
132 (1925). The Court upheld the Prohibition-era warrantless search of a car stopped on the
basis of probable cause to believe the vehicle contained contraband liquor. The Court ex-
plained that the vehicle's mobility gave rise to exigent circumstances that excused the ob-
taining of a warrant. Id. at 153. The Court later extended the underlying rationale of the
automobile exception to include the diminished expectation of privacy surrounding vehicles.
Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590 (1974) (plurality opinion). The Court in Cardwell held
that an automobile does not deserve the fullest level of fourth amendment protection be-
cause it is used for transportation and not as a residence or place to store personal effects. In
addition, its contents and occupants are exposed to public scrutiny while traveling public
thoroughfares. Id. at 590.
23. The exception to the warrant requirement in Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752,
755-58 (1969), embodied the common law right to search an arrestee as incident to a lawful
arrest. The possibility of concealed weapons or destruction of evidence by the suspect gave
rise to the exigent circumstances that validated the search incident to arrest exception. Id at
762-63. A search made incident to a valid arrest is, however, limited to the suspect himself
and the area within his immediate control. Id
24. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-99 (1967). The Court held that police may
enter a private place without a warrant in pursuit of a suspect in an exigent situation. Id
The Court gave the prevention of the escape of the suspect and harm to the officers as the
primary rationale underlying the hot pursuit exception. Id at 299. The scope of the search
under this exception may be as broad as is reasonably necessary to prevent the danger of
resistance or escape by the suspect. Id
25. The Court in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973), held that even lack-
ing sufficient probable cause to obtain a warrant, police could conduct a warrantless search
of a suspect who voluntarily gave his consent. Id at 219.
26. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 464-71 (1971) (plurality opinion).
27. Judge Moylan noted that even though Justice Stewart's references to a plain view
doctrine in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 464-71 (1971), connote a long legal
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rate exception to the warrant requirement in a plurality decision in Coo-
lidge v. New Hampshire. 28 The primary opinion of the Coolidge Court
required law enforcement officials to show that three conditions were met
at the time of the seizure in order to justify a warrantless seizure29 of an
incriminatory object in plain view. First, the initial intrusion upon the
individual's privacy must have been justified.30 Second, the discovery of
the object must have been inadvertent. 31 Third, the incriminatory nature
of the item must have been immediately apparent.32
The Coolidge enunciation of the plain view doctrine has caused consid-
erable confusion in the lower courts. The term "plain view" is in itself
misleading33 since every open visual observance by an officer does not per-
mit a warrantless seizure under the plain view doctrine. Justice Stewart,
writing for the Coolidge plurality,34 pointed out that most items seized will
ancestry, plain view as a doctrine "seems to have sprung full-blown from [the Coolidge]
plurality opinion." Moylan,supra note 9, at 1047. United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559 (1927),
often receives credit as the first plain view case. Comment, Constitutional Standardsfor Ap-
p ying the Plain View Doctrine, 6 ST. MARY'S L.J. 725, 725 (1974). In Lee revenue officers on
board a Coast Guard cutter discovered, with the aid of a searchlight, cases of contraband
liquor on Lee's motorboat and seized them. The Court held that no search had occurred
when the contraband was plainly visible. Id. at 563. The Court did not mention plain view,
however, and justified the Lee seizure by analogizing the exigencies of the situation to those
underlying the automobile exception. Id. at 563.
28. 403 U.S. 443 (1971). Coolidge concerned the search of a car in connection with the
murder of a little girl. On the day Coolidge was arrested, the state attorney general who had
taken over the investigation of the case obtained a search warrant for Coolidge's car. The
car, which was in Coolidge's driveway, was towed to the police station and searched three
times within the next year. Vacuum sweepings of the car were admitted as evidence at trial.
The plurality opinion is divided into three sections. Part I invalidates the search warrant
as not having been issued by a neutral and detached magistrate. Id. at 449-53. Part II is
subdivided into four parts. Part Il-A negates the Coolidge search as falling within the search
incident to arrest exception, id at 455-57, and part II-B disallows the search as an automo-
bile exception, id at 458-64. Part lI-C delineates the plain view doctrine, but also rejects
that theory as justification for the search. Id. at 464-73. Finally, part II-D is a rebuttal of
Justice White's dissent. Id at 473-84. Part III deals with the consent by the defendant's
spouse to allow the search of the defendant's property. Id. at 484-90. Whether the Coolidge
formulation of the plain view doctrine has been approved by a majority of the Court is
unclear due to this division of the primary opinion, as well as to Justice Harlan's fragmented
concurrence.
29. The plain view doctrine specifically applies to warrantless seizures and not warrant-
less searches. Items that are knowingly exposed to the public or viewed by an officer who is
legally positioned to do so are not protected by the fourth amendment. Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). Therefore, when an item is sighted in plain view, no search
has occurred. Id.
30. 403 U.S. at 468.
31. Id. at 469-71.
32. Id at 466.
33. The Supreme Court added to the confusion by using phrases similar to plain view
merely as descriptive terms in several pre-Coolidge cases involving the search incident to
arrest exception. See, e.g., Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699, 714 (1948) (Vinson, C.J.,
dissenting) ("open view"); Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 186 (1947) ("plain sight");
Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 358 (193 1) ("visible and accessible");
see also Moylan, supra note 9, at 1050.
34. The plurality consisted of Justices Stewart, Douglas, Brennan, Marshall, and, con-
curring only in parts I, II-D, and Ii, Justice Harlan. The precedential value of the opinion
is uncertain because of this configuration. See infra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
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be in plain view at the moment of seizure. 35 The fact that the evidence
seized was in plain view becomes legally significant, however, only when a
law enforcement officer has a prior valid reason for his initial intrusion.
Only then does the plain view doctrine supplement the prior justification
for the encroachment and permit a warrantless seizure.36
The first requirement of the plain view doctrine, therefore, is a prior
valid intrusion on the part of the police. An officer standing on the street
who views an item of contraband through an open window, for example,
may not rely on the plain view doctrine to support a warrantless seizure of
the item. As the Coolidge Court emphasized, "plain view alone is never
enough to justify the warrantless seizure of evidence. ' 37 The prior valid
intrusion requirement assures that two distinct constitutional protections
embodied in the warrant requirement are met.38 First, the necessity and
lawfulness of the intrusion has already been established, so the search is a
reasonable one. Second, given the initial intrusion, the seizure of an object
in plain view does not convert the search into a general rummaging in a
person's belongings. The Coolidge plurality characterized the seizure of an
object in plain view in the course of a valid search as a minor threat to the
protections of the fourth amendment when balanced against a major ad-
vance in effective law enforcement.3 9
The second prong of the Coolidge test requires that the discovery of evi-
dence in plain view be inadvertent.40 The purpose of this element is to
prevent the conversion of an authorized limited search into a general
one.41 The requirement that police procure a warrant when they antici-
pate the discovery of evidence, know the location of the evidence, and in-
tend to seize it works little hardship in a legal system that generally views
warrantless searches and seizures as unreasonable.4 2 In contrast, requiring
a warrant for inadvertent discovery during an already valid intrusion re-
sults in great inconvenience to the police.43 Officers would be forced either
to guard the evidence while a warrant was obtained or to risk losing the
evidence during their absence.44
Commentators have criticized the inadvertence requirement as unwork-
able for several reasons. The most perplexing problem arises from at-
tempts to specify how much inadvertence is necessary to validate a plain
35. 403 U.S. at 465.
36. Id. at 466.
37. Id. at 468 (emphasis in original).
38. Id. at 467.
39. Id. Even though the Court had just emphasized the importance of the warrant re-
quirement, it later discounted the necessity of obtaining a warrant for an object in plain view
during a lawful search as a needless inconvenience that could result in danger either to the
evidence or to the police. Id. at 467-68.
40. Id at 469.
41. Id. at 469-70.
42. Id. at 470; see supra note 20 and accompanying text.
43. 403 U.S. at 470.
44. Id Justice Black argued that the relevant test of reasonableness is not the reasona-
bleness of the opportunity to obtain a warrant, but the reasonableness of the seizure itself
under the particular circumstances. Id. at 509 (Black, J., concurring and dissenting).
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view seizure.45 If police have sufficient probable cause to obtain a warrant
or are making a search incident to an arrest, they probably expect to dis-
cover contraband, weapons, or incriminating evidence. Consequently, the
inadvertence requirement can create ironic problems of proof at suppres-
sion hearings in these cases.46 The court must decide whether the officer,
at some time prior to the search, may have had sufficient probable cause to
obtain a search warrant for the seized plain-view item. The officer will
argue that no probable cause existed before the intrusion, while the de-
fendant will contend that probable cause existed and that the police should
have obtained a warrant.47 To avoid this dilemma, most lower courts in-
terpret the inadvertence requirement as meaning that any discovery of
items not named in the search warrant is inadvertent, despite the personal
expectations of searching officers, if there were not sufficient grounds for
the issuance of a warrant naming those items.48
Language used by Justice Stewart in Coolidge, which indicated that the
warrantless seizure of items that are contraband, stolen, or dangerous in
nature need not be inadvertent, has provided another source of confusion
over the inadvertence requirement. 49 A broad reading of this language
would indicate that a planned warrantless seizure of contraband, stolen, or
dangerous items is per se reasonable under the fourth amendment. 50 This
45. Id at 506-10 (Black, J., concurring and dissenting); id at 519-20 (White, J., concur-
ring and dissenting); see 2 W. LAFAVE, supra note 11, § 4.11, at 178-83, § 7.5, at 603-05; see
also Moylan, supra note 9, at 1083-84 (questioning degree of inadvertence required).
46. See Kalven, The Supreme Court, 1970 Term, 85 HARV. L. REV. 3, 245 (1971).
47. Id.
48. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Cefalo, 381 Mass. 319, 409 N.E.2d 719, 727-28 (1980)
(even though warrant was issued for blood-stained clothing, discovery of bag containing
blood-stained tissue and handkerchief was inadvertent since police had no probable cause
prior to entry of room to believe items would be there); State v. Richards, 294 N.C. 474, 242
S.E.2d 844, 852-56 (1978) (although police are generally aware of involvement of other guns,
discovery of other guns while executing warrant for a particular gun held inadvertent since
police had no information as to their description or location); Commonwealth v. Millard,
273 Pa. Super. 523, 417 A.2d 1171, 1174-75 (1979) (while executing warrant for missing keys
of rape victim police found window bolt they knew to have been removed to gain entry;
discovery held inadvertent since, not knowing of bolt's location, police had no grounds to
obtain warrant for it); State v. McColgan, 631 S.W.2d 151, 154-55 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1981)
(police awareness of possibility of finding evidence not sufficient basis for concluding discov-
ery not inadvertent); see also 2 W. LAFAVE, supra note 11, § 4.11, at 179-80.
An alternate theory would negate inadvertence if officers had any expectation of finding
evidence, despite a lack of probable cause to know it is likely to be found. United States v.
Hare, 589 F.2d 1291, 1294-95 (6th Cir. 1979). This view of inadvertence has raised fears that
law enforcement would be severely hampered. Comment, "Inadvertence" The Increasingly
Vestigial Prong of the Plain View Doctrine, 10 MEM. ST. U.L. REV. 399, 401-02 (1980).
49. 403 U.S. at 471. This language was criticized by Justice White as a return to the
distinction between seizure of contraband and mere evidence of a crime, which the Court
had done away with in Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 310 (1967). Coolidge, 403 U.S. at
519 (White, J., concurring and disssenting). In Warden officers searching a house while in
hot pursuit of a robber discovered some clothing of the kind the robber was reported to have
worn. The warrantless seizure of the clothing was upheld since the officers could have rea-
sonably believed that the items would aid in identifying the culprit. Warden, 387 U.S. at
307.
50. Some lower courts have used this distinction to circumvent the inadvertence re-
quirement. See, e.g., United States v. Vargas, 621 F.2d 54, 56 (2d Cir.) (furniture with com-
partments holding heroin held justifiably seized even though searched prior to delivery to
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reading must be tempered, however, by the plurality's earlier statement of
the basic rule that warrantless seizures are prohibited even if an object is
contraband. 51 Because of the difficulty of practical application, some
courts have simply refused to apply the inadvertence standard, stating that
a majority of the Supreme Court has not approved it.52 Generally, how-
ever, Justice Harlan's concurrence has been regarded as a belated affirma-
tion of the plurality's formulation. 53
The third plain view criterion announced in Coolidge requires that the
police realize immediately that they have discovered incriminatory
items.54 The Court justified the immediately apparent requirement as a
means of preventing the extension of a limited valid search into a general
exploratory one. 55 Although this element clearly indicates that not every
item in plain view is seizable, the Coolidge opinion failed to elaborate on
the degree of certainty necessary to make the incriminating nature of an
object immediately apparent. In an earlier attempt to define objects that
are seizable, the Court referred to a nexus between the object and the crim-
inal behavior. 56 This nexus was satisfied if the police officers had probable
cause to believe that the evidence would aid in a particular apprehension
or conviction. 57 While most state courts have adopted probable cause as
sufficient for the determination that an item is incriminating, 58 a few have
suggested other standards. One early case held that items that merely
arouse suspicion satisfy the immediately apparent requirement.5 9 At the
defendants), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 854 (1980); United States v. Smollar, 357 F. Supp. 628,
633 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (seizure of stolen credit card upheld even though postal inspectors were
already engaged in investigation of subject for mail theft of credit cards).
51. Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 468.
52. See United States v. Bradshaw, 490 F.2d 1097, 1101 n.3 (4th Cir. 1974); Brisendine
v. State, 130 Ga. App. 249, 203 S.E.2d 308, 309 (1973); State v. Pontier, 95 Idaho 707, 518
P.2d 969, 974 (1974).
53. Although Justice Harlan did not concur in the enunciation of the doctrine in part II-
C, commentators have generally regarded his joining in part II-D as an endorsement of the
plain view formulation. See Moylan, supra note 9, at 1049; Comment, "Plain View"--Any-
thing But Plain: Coolidge Divides the Lower Courts, 7 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 489, 510 (1974);
Comment, supra note 27, at 730-3 1.
54. 403 U.S. at 466.
55. Id at 466-67. As an example of the deterrent effect of the immediately apparent
standard, the plurality cited with approval the concurring opinion in Stanley v. Georgia, 394
U.S. 557, 571-72 (1969) (Stewart, J. concurring in result). Stanley involved the search of the
defendant's home under a valid warrant for evidence of illegal bookmaking. The officers
seized reels of film that were later determined to be pornographic in content. While the
majority opinion dealt only with a first amendment issue involving Georgia law, the concur-
ring Justices reached the fourth amendment issue and found the seizure of the film unconsti-
tutional. Id at 572. Not only was the film omitted from the description in the warrant, but
the officers also had no reason to believe that the reels, which were in plain view, were
contraband until they had spent 50 minutes viewing them on Stanley's projector. Id
56. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 306-07 (1967).
57. Id at 306-07.
58. For an exhaustive list of state courts that have adopted the probable cause standard,
see Comment, supra note 53, at 505-06 n.121.
59. United States v. Hill, 447 F.2d 817, 819 (7th Cir. 1971). Officers arrested a defend-
ant loitering near a building and found keys on the ground in plain view. Upon opening the
building's garage with the keys, they discovered auto parts and stripped-down cars. The
court upheld the admission of the evidence on the ground that the defendant's actions had
[Vol. 37
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other end of the spectrum, another court demanded more than mere prob-
able cause out of concern that anything less would obviate the need for
obtaining search warrants at all.60 The recent Supreme Court decision in
Colorado v. Bannister 6' implicitly indicates that probable cause is the cor-
rect standard underlying the immediately apparent requirement. 62 In Ban-
nister the Court upheld a warrantless seizure of suspected stolen items
after a car was stopped for a speeding violation. The officer noticed items
inside the car that matched the description of property taken in a recent
theft. The Court permitted the warrantless seizure since the officers had
probable cause to believe that the items were evidence of a crime.63
C. Seizure of Containers in Plain View
Even the adoption of probable cause as a basis for the immediately ap-
parent requirement does not alleviate the difficulty of applying the plain
view doctrine in the case of containers. Weapons or contraband are rou-
tinely carried in opaque containers, some of which belie the nature of their
contents. In these cases, many of which fall under the automobile excep-
tion,64 the Court has relied on the reasonable expectation of privacy ra-
tionale65 to distinguish types of containers.
In United States v. Chadwick 66 the Court refused to extend the automo-
bile exception to uphold the warrantless search of a double-locked foot-
locker that contained marijuana. Federal agents who had received a tip
followed three suspected drug couriers but waited to arrest them and seize
the trunk until after it had been loaded into the suspects' car. The agents
later broke open the footlocker and discovered the contraband. At trial
the government attempted to justify the search under the automobile ex-
aroused suspicion, even though the viewing of the keys gave no indication they could be
used to open the garage and the viewing of the contents of the garage only raised a suspicion
of criminal activity. Id; see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1968) (upholding "stop
and frisk" for weapons in order to protect officer where articulable basis for suspicion
exists).
60. United States v. Smollar, 357 F. Supp. 628, 632-33 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). The court did
not define the standard it considered proper, but concluded that the inspector's probable
cause to arrest the defendant combined with other evidence gave him "strong reason to
believe" that the credit card was stolen. Id at 633.
61. 449 U.S. 1 (1980) (per curiam).
62. Id. at 3. Although the opinion cited automobile search cases, it emphasized plain
view criteria such as the legitimacy of the vehicle stop, the inadvertent discovery of the
evidence, and the plain view of the evidence inside the car. Id at 3-4.
63. Id. at 3.
64. See supra note 22.
65. According to Professor Ashdown, the Burger Court has formulated a three-level
privacy model: (1) a legitimate privacy interest invoking full fourth amendment protections,
typified by United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977); (2) diminished privacy interests
governed only by the reasonableness clause of the fourth amendment, typified by the "stop
and frisk" search of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); and (3) absence of any privacy expec-
tations whatsoever so that no fourth amendment protection is implicated, typified by the
refusal of the Court to recognize any privacy interest in phone numbers dialed from a cer-
tain telephone in Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979). Ashdown, supra note 7, at 1298-
1310. Professor Ashdown contends that the Court's privacy model is an attempt to accom-
modate local law enforcement officials. Id at 1310.
66. 433 U.S. 1 (1977).
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ception, arguing that the location of the footlocker in the car's trunk made
the footlocker mobile. The Court held the warrantless search invalid, stat-
ing that the defendants expected that the contents of the footlocker would
not be subject to examination. 67 Because the agents had already obtained
control of the footlocker, no exigent circumstances existed, so the govern-
ment's search without a warrant was unreasonable. 68 The majority also
refused to view the footlocker as a personal effect that could have been
searched incident to a lawful arrest. 69
The Court reaffirmed its privacy rationale as applied to containers by
refusing to extend the automobile exception to include a warrantless
search of luggage taken from a lawfully stopped vehicle in Arkansas v.
Sanders.70 In a footnote the Sanders Court further explained that the na-
ture of the container itself can affect the level of fourth amendment protec-
tion it requires:
Not all containers and packages found by police during the course
of a search will deserve the full protection of the Fourth Amendment.
Thus, some containers (for example a kit of burglar tools or a gun
case) by their very nature cannot support any reasonable expectation
of privacy because their contents can be inferred from their outward
appearance. Similarly, in some cases the contents of a package will be
open to "plain view," thereby obviating the need for a warrant.7'
The plurality in Robbins v. California quoted this footnote with ap-
proval.72 In Robbins the Court invalidated the warrantless search of pack-
ages wrapped in opaque plastic, asserting that the holding of Sanders
extended to containers other than suitcases but was limited by the two ex-
ceptions mentioned in the Sanders footnote. 73 The Robbins plurality did
not agree with the lower court's contention that experienced observers
would have inferred from the appearance of the packages that they con-
tained marijuana bricks.74 The Court observed that both exceptions re-
67. Id at 11.
68. Id
69. Id
70. 442 U.S. 753, 765 (1979). Police officers had received a tip that Sanders would be
leaving the airport with a green suitcase containing marijuana. Officers observed Sanders
putting the suitcase into the trunk of a taxi and leaving. The officers followed, stopped the
taxi, and directed the taxi driver to open the trunk. They opened the suitcase without Sand-
ers's permission and found marijuana.
71. Id at 764-65 n.13. The dissent objected that classifying containers according to
privacy expectations would create great confusion for the courts, law enforcement officers,
suspects, and prosecutors. Id. at 768 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). "Still hanging in limbo,
and probably soon to be litigated, are the briefcase, the wallet, the package, the paper bag,
and every other kind of container." Id.
72. 453 U.S. 420, 427 (1981). In Robbins California highway patrolmen lawfully
stopped a car. When they detected the smell of marijuana, the officers performed a "pat-
down" search during which they discovered a vial of liquid and drug paraphernalia in the
car. After placing Robbins in the patrol car they opened the trunk and discovered two
rectangular packages wrapped in opaque plastic that they unwrapped to reveal 30 pounds of
marijuana.
73. d.
74. Id at 427-28. The Court rejected claims by the State of California that the fourth
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ferred to in the Sanders footnote were essentially plain view exceptions. 75
The Court reasoned that containers that proclaim their contents through
their distinctive configuration are not really removed from the view of a
searching officer. The same would be true of containers that are transpar-
ent or clearly reveal their contents.
76
The Supreme Court effectively overruled Robbins on its facts in United
States v. Ross. 7 7 The police in Ross had received a reliable tip that the
defendant was selling heroin from his car. Upon locating the car the of-
ficers arrested Ross and searched his trunk. They found a closed brown
paper bag that they opened to reveal glassine bags containing heroin. A
second warrantless search at police headquarters disclosed a zippered
leather pouch containing cash. The district court upheld the searches of
both of these differing containers and denied a motion to suppress the evi-
dence.78 The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit re-
versed, holding that Ross possessed a reasonable expectation of privacy in
both containers. 79 The court of appeals refused to differentiate between
the degree of protection afforded each container by the fourth amendment
and held that a warrant was required to search either container. 80 The
Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, distinguishing the facts of
the case from Chadwick and Sanders. Those cases focused on the nature
of the containers and not on the presence of preexisting probable cause to
search the vehicle itself.8 ' The Ross search thus fitted within the category
of automobile exceptions. 82 The Court stated that the scope of the search
should be based on the reasonable likelihood that the area searched will
contain the items that are sought and should not be limited by the reason-
able expectation of privacy manifested by the type of container. 83 A paper
bag found in the trunk would therefore be subject to search without a war-
rant if the police have probable cause to believe the automobile contains
narcotics.84 The Ross decision did not eliminate all distinctions between
containers based on a privacy rationale, however, because the Court
quoted the Sanders footnote without apparent disapproval.
85
The Sanders footnote raises the question of how distinctive the configur-
ation of the container must be to remove it from fourth amendment pro-
amendment protects only those containers that carry personal effects and -noted that what
one person might put into a suitcase, another might carry in a paper bag. Id at 426-27.
75. Id. at 427.
76. Id.
77. 456 U.S. 798 (1982).
78. Id. at 801.
79. United States v. Ross, 655 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
80. Id at 1171. The appeals court stated the rule that if police lawfully stop a car and
detain suspects within it they must obtain a search warrant for any secured parcels found
within the car. Id
81. 456 U.S. at 809-17.
82. Id at 817; see supra note 22.
83. 456 U.S. at 824. Under Ross, therefore, officers looking for a large weapon such as a
rifle could not reasonably search a paper bag. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 814 n.19.
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tection. A related question asks whether an experienced police officer who
knows that glassine envelopes are commonly used to carry heroin has suffi-
cient probable cause for a warrantless search when the envelopes would
not represent a distinct configuration to a lay person. 86 One commentator
has suggested that the Sanders footnote should be limited to true plain
view cases, noting that the question of whether the officer's experience and
expertise permit the conclusion that certain borderline packages contain
contraband is precisely the sort of issue that calls for the detached judg-
ment of a magistrate.8 7
The plain view doctrine has proved confusing in application, particu-
larly with regard to the search of containers. The Supreme Court has pro-
vided little explanation of its Coolidge formulation, which is conceptually
difficult for courts to apply.8 8 The Supreme Court granted certiorari in
Texas v. Brown to improve this situation by clarifying the standard under-
lying the immediately apparent requirement of the plain view doctrine.
II. TE.XAs v. BRowN
In Texas v. Brown the Supreme Court explicitly held that probable
cause to believe that an item may be contraband, stolen property, or evi-
dence of a crime is sufficient to support the immediately apparent require-
ment of the plain view doctrine.8 9 In so holding the Court acknowledged
that even though the contents of an opaque container may not be visible,
an officer's knowledge that a particular container is commonly used to
transport illicit substances may raise the requisite probable cause.90 The
plurality opinion, authored by Justice Rehnquist, 91 began with a brief dis-
cussion of fourth amendment law that reaffirmed the Court's emphasis on
the warrant clause. 92 The opinion noted, however, that in a wide range of
varying situations the Court has recognized flexible, common-sense excep-
86. Cf. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18 (1981) (standard of probable cause
broadened to include specialized knowledge of experienced officer as basis). The Court in
Cortez authorized officers to stop and seize persons on the basis of "particularized suspi-
cion" raised by their experienced assessment of the totality of the circumstances. Two ele-
ments must be present before such a stop is permissible: (1) the assessment must be based on
all the circumstances, including the officer's trained deductions and inferences, and (2) the
assessment must raise a suspicion that the individual is a wrongdoer. Id.
87. 2 W. LAFAVE, supra note 11, § 7.2, at 185 (Supp. 1983).
88. Judge Moylan recognized that the plain view doctrine suffers from both over- and
underemployment due to the conceptual difficulty of determining when it does and does not
apply. Moylan, supra note 9, at 1088. Underemployment is due to the incorrect extension of
the initial reason for the intrusion, for example, the automobile exception, to validate the
seizure of an object that actually falls within the plain view doctrine. Id at 1088-96; see
Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 61 (1967) (reasonable search incident to arrest). Overem-
ployment results from the erroneous belief that a police officer may seize anything in plain
view. Moylan, supra note 9, at 1096-1101; see supra notes 33-36 and accompanying text.
89. 103 S. Ct. 1535, 1543, 75 L. Ed. 2d 502, 514 (1983).
90. Id
91. Chief Justice Burger and Justices White and O'Connor joined the plurality opinion.
Justice White also wrote a separate concurrence. Id. at 1544, 75 L. Ed. 2d at 515.
92. Id at 1539, 75 L. Ed. 2d at 509.
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tions to the warrant requirement. 93 The Court then turned to the plain
view exception and appeared to back away from the Coolidge formulation.
The Court emphasized that the Coolidge plain view standards have never
been adopted by a majority of the Justices and do not constitute binding
precedent.94 Nevertheless, the plurality acknowledged that the Coolidge
opinion should be the point of reference for discussion. 95 Although the
Coolidge plurality characterized the plain view doctrine as an independent
exception to the warrant requirement, the Brown plurality viewed that
description as inaccurate, at least from an analytical standpoint.96 The
Court stressed that plain view is simply an extension of the prior justifica-
tion for an officer's access to an item.97 Once a legitimate intrusion has
occurred and an officer has spotted an incriminating item in plain view,
the owner has lost his right to an expectation of privacy. 98 Requiring a
warrant for such an item, the Court reasoned, would create a needless in-
convenience for the police officer. 99 The Court stated that the proper test
of the reasonableness of a law enforcement practice continues to be the
balancing of the degree of its intrusion on fourth amendment interests
against its value in the promotion of legitimate government objectives.10 °
The Court next applied the requirements of the plain view doctrine to
the facts of Texas v. Brown. The Court had previously indicated that it
would uphold a roadblock-type license check as a valid warrantless intru-
sion.' 01 The acts of shining a flashlight into a car10 2 and bending down to
look inside a car likewise violated no fourth amendment protections.10 3
The first requirement of the plain view doctrine, the occurrence of a prior
valid intrusion, was therefore indisputably met.10 4
Moving to the immediately apparent requirement, the Court observed
that the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals had insisted that the officer
know with near certainty of the seizable nature of an object.' 0 5 The Court
93. Id. The Court cited six separate exceptions to the warrant requirement and three
other less severe intrusions that do not require a warrant. Id, 75 L. Ed. 2d at 509-10.
94. Id., 75 L. Ed. 2d at 509.
95. Id at 1540, 75 L. Ed. 2d at 510-11.
96. Id., 75 L. Ed. 2d at 511.
97. Id. at 1541, 75 L. Ed. 2d at 511; see supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
98. 103 S. Ct. at 1541, 75 L. Ed. 2d at 511.
99. Id, 75 L. Ed. 2d at 512; see supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
100. 103 S. Ct. at 1541, 75 L. Ed. 2d at 512.
101. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979). While holding that the random stop-
ping of vehicles to check for a driver's license or vehicle registration was unreasonable under
the fourth amendment, the Prouse Court suggested that the questioning of all oncoming
traffic at a roadblock-type stop involved less intrusion and less selective discretion on the
part of officers. Id. The officers in Brown were engaged in a roadblock-type operation.
102. The Court cited United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559, 563 (1927), which declared that
the use of a light was not prohibited by the Constitution.
103. The Court cited Justice Harlan's concurrence in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,
361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring), in asserting that no legitimate expectation of privacy
exists as to the interior of a vehicle that can be seen from outside by either passers-by or
diligent police officers. 103 S. Ct. at 1541, 75 L. Ed. 2d at 512-13.
104. Id. at 1542, 75 L. Ed. 2d at 513.
105. Id; see Brown v. State, 617 S.W.2d 196, 200 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981) (en banc).
Interestingly, the Texas court had not adopted a standard stricter than probable cause in its
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characterized the use of the language "immediately apparent" in Coolidge
as an unfortunate choice of words because that phrase can be understood
as requiring an unduly high degree of certainty of an object's incrimina-
tory nature. 0 6 The Court held that probable cause to associate the object
with criminal activity sufficiently supports the reasonableness of a seizure
under the fourth amendment. 0 7
As to the degree of probable cause required, the Court noted that prob-
able cause is a flexible, common-sense standard, 0 8 which requires only
that the facts available to an officer would cause a reasonable man to be-
lieve that the items might be incriminating. No showing that the belief is
correct or even more likely true than false is necessary. 0 9 The Court fur-
ther held that the suspicion of a police officer based on his knowledge and
experience satisfies the probable cause standard. 0 The immediately ap-
parent requirement was thus met in Brown, since the officer's knowledge
that balloons are frequently used as narcotics containers coupled with his
view of the suspicious contents of the glove compartment provided prob-
able cause that Brown was engaged in illicit activities."' The Court im-
plicitly reaffirmed the Sanders footnote,' 2 stating that the officer's
inability to view the actual contents of the balloon was essentially irrele-
vant due to the distinctive character of the container itself." 1 3
Finally, the Court stated that the inadvertence requirement was unques-
tionably satisfied in Brown." 14 Although the officers at the checkpoint may
have had a generalized expectation that some of the cars stopped would
contain illegal substances, there was no indication that they were operating
previous applications of the plain view doctrine. See, e.g., Howard v. State, 599 S.W.2d 597,
603-04 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) (court invalidated seizure of medicine bottle because officer
had no basis to believe contents were inherently suspicious or contraband); DeLao v. State,
550 S.W.2d 289, 291 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977) (seizure of balloon containing heroin invali-
dated when it was not proved that heroin is commonly carried in balloons or that officer had
knowledge of such a practice); Duncan v. State, 549 S.W.2d 730, 732 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977)
(officer saw defendant slip plastic bag into pocket; but seizure invalidated because officer
had no knowledge or suspicion of what contents were); Nicholas v. State, 502 S.W.2d 169,
172 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973) (photographic negatives suppressed because officers had neither
knowledge nor suspicion of their incriminatory nature prior to examining them).
106. 103 S. Ct. at 1542, 75 L. Ed. 2d at 513.
107. Id, 75 L. Ed. 2d at 513-14. The Court specifically left open the issue of whether in
certain circumstances a degree of suspicion less than probable cause would provide a suffi-
cient basis for seizure. Id at 1542 n.7, 75 L. Ed. 2d at 513 n.7. One commentator has
suggested that, although warrantless searches should only be justified by exigent circum-
stances, warrantless seizures should be permitted whenever the police have probable cause
to seize an object. Grano, Rethinking the Fourth Amendment Warrant Requirement, 19 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 612, 647-50 (1982).
108. 103 S. Ct. at 1543, 75 L. Ed. 2d at 514.
109. Id
110. Id
111. Id; cf. DeLao v. State, 550 S.W.2d 289, 291 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977) (no probable
cause to seize balloon existed when officer had no experience with container, and no suspi-
cious surrounding circumstances were present).
112. Arkansas v. Sanders, 415 U.S. 753, 764-65 n.13 (1979); see supra notes 71-91 and
accompanying text.
113, 103 S. Ct. at 1543, 75 L. Ed. 2d at 514.
114. Id at 1543-44, 75 L. Ed. 2d at 514-15.
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the stop as a pretext for seeking out narcotics or that Officer Maples had
probable cause to believe that any particular object would be located in
Brown's car before he viewed the balloon." 5 While acknowledging that
the inadvertence standard was met in Brown, the plurality hinted at its
general dissatisfaction with the requirement and indicated that it might
reconsider the requirement in the future." 6 The Court held that the
seizure of the balloon was valid under the fourth amendment, reversed the
judgment of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, and remanded the case
for further proceedings.' '7
Justice Powell concurred in the judgment but expressed disapproval of
the plurality's decreased emphasis on the warrant clause in defining the
reasonableness of police intrusion." 8 Noting that his prior opinions ex-
pressed a belief that exceptions to the warrant clause should be infrequent
and carefully defined, 19 Justice Powell contended that the plurality opin-
ion extended well beyond the application of the plain view doctrine by
casting doubt on the Coolidge formulation. 20 He agreed, however, that
the officer's suspicion, which was raised by the nature of the container,
satisfied the probable cause standard underlying the immediately apparent
requirement. ' 2
In a separate concurrence in the judgment Justice Stevens, joined by
Justices Brennan and Marshall, maintained that the plurality's opinion
was incomplete because it gave inadequate consideration to those cases
holding that a warrant is required to search a closed container even when
the container is in plain view and probable cause as to the illicit nature of
its contents exists. 122 While agreeing that the balloon had been validly
seized, Justice Stevens contended that the opening of the closed container
constituted a serious intrusion on fourth amendment privacy values 23 and
115. Id, 75 L. Ed. 2d at 515; see supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text (degree of
inadvertence required).
116. 103 S. Ct. at 1543, 75 L. Ed. 2d at 514-15.
117. Id at 1544, 75 L. Ed. 2d at 515. While joining in the plurality opinion, Justice
White authored a separate two-sentence concurrence for the sole purpose of registering his
continuing disagreement with the inadvertence requirement of Coolidge. Id He empha-
sized that the Brown plurality opinion did not purport to endorse this requirement. Id.
118. Id, 75 L. Ed. 2d at 515-16. Justice Powell, joined by Justice Blackmun, noted the
Justices' continuing disagreement as to the effect of the warrant clause on the reasonableness
standard. 1d; see supra note 8.
119. 103 S. Ct. at 1544, 15 L. Ed. 2d at 515-16 (quoting United States v. United States
Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 318 (1972)). Contra 103 S. Ct. at 1539, 75 L. Ed. 2d at 509
(plurality opinion) (characterization of exceptions as numerous and flexible).
120. Id. at 1544-45, 75 L. Ed. 2d at 515-16.
121. Id. at 1545, 75 L. Ed. 2d at 515-16.
122. Id, 75 L. Ed. 2d at 517. Justice Stevens cites as examples United States v. Ross, 456
U.S. 798 (1982); Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979); and United States v. Chadwick,
433 U.S. 1 (1977).
123. 103 S. Ct. at 1546-47, 75 L. Ed. 2d at'517-18. Although respondent Brown had not
challenged the search of the balloon, Justice Stevens thought the search had to be separated
from the seizure in order to clarify the extent of the Court's decision. Id at 1546 n. 1, 75 L.
Ed. 2d at 518 n. 1. Justice Stevens admitted that it was not clear to him whether, under Texas
law, Brown could still argue that the evidence should be suppressed because the search of
the balloon was illegal. Id at 1546, 75 L. Ed. 2d at 518.
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that the state should be required to justify its warrantless search.124 Justice
Stevens offered two possible justifications for the search. First, the officer's
view of the contents of the glove compartment coupled with the observa-
tion of the balloon gave him probable cause to believe that additional con-
traband was located somewhere in the car, thus bringing the situation
squarely within the automobile exception. 25 If this were so, the case
would be governed by United States v. Ross, 126 and the search of any
container in the car, including the balloon, would be permissible. Second,
the balloon was arguably a container that revealed its contents by its out-
ward appearance and thus did not support any reasonable expectation of
privacy. 27 Justice Stevens concluded that a Texas court, rather than the
Supreme Court, should make the factual inquiry into the reason for the
warrantless search of the balloon. 28
A plurality of the Supreme Court in Texas v. Brown established that
probable cause is the standard underlying the immediately apparent re-
quirement of the Coolidge plain view doctrine. The Court included in its
formulation of probable cause an officer's belief, based on his experience
and the surrounding circumstances, that he has discovered incriminating
evidence. The significance of Texas v. Brown, however, lies more in its
implications. Only two members of the Court were expressly willing to
defend the Coolidge formulation of the plain view doctrine. 29 The plural-
ity opinion, which challenges the precedential value of Coolidge,130 may
cause confusion in the lower courts, most of which have followed the Coo-
lidge formulation. After Brown the courts will have to predict the future
validity of the inadvertence element of plain view.' 3' The Brown opinion
124. Id at 1547, 75 L. Ed. 2d at 519.
125. Id
126. 456 U.S. 798 (1982); see supra notes 77-85 and accompanying text. Ross was
handed down after the decision of the Texas appeals court in Brown v. State, 617 S.W.2d
196 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981) (en banc).
127. 103 S. Ct. at 1547, 75 L. Ed. 2d at 519-20. Justice Stevens quoted from Arkansas v.
Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 764 n. 13 (1979). See supra notes 70-87 and accompanying text. Jus-
tice Stevens observed that the sight of a container can often generate greater certainty about
its contents than the sight of the contents themselves. The viewing of white powder in a
clear container might generate less certainty that it is heroin than the sight of a partially full,
tied-off balloon. Id. at 1548 n.5, 75 L. Ed. 2d at 520 n.5.
128. Id. at 1548, 75 L. Ed. 2d at 520.
129. See id at 1544, 75 L. Ed. 2d at 515 (Powell, J., and Blackmun, J., concurring in the
judgment). The concurrence of Justices Stevens, Brennan, and Marshall sidesteps the inad-
vertence issue. See id at 1544, 75 L. Ed. 2d at 516. Since Justices Brennan and Marshall
were members of the Coolidge plurality and have not explicitly expressed changes in their
views, an argument can be made that at least four Justices would reaffirm the inadvertence
requirement.
130. Id. at 1540, 75 L. Ed. 2d at 509.
131. Since the Brown decision, two lower courts have noted the uncertain status of the
inadvertence requirement. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit was careful not to
rest a decision on whether the viewing by customs officers of wrapped packages of mari-
juana was inadvertent because of its uncertainty that the inadvertence requirement survived
Brown. United States v. Johns, No. 82-1080 (9th Cir. June 10, 1983). The Supreme Court of
Rhode Island stated that the somewhat critical treatment of the inadvertence requirement in
Brown may perplex the lower courts in their attempts to determine the state of the plain
view doctrine. State v. Eiseman, No. 81-501-C.A. (R.I. June 10, 1983).
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may also cast doubt on whether the doctrine continues to be regarded as a
separate exception to the warrant requirement. Moreover, Texas v. Brown
reflects continuing disagreement among the Justices as to the importance
of the warrant requirement. Brown also indicates that even after United
States v. Ross, 132 the concept of varying levels of privacy expectations
manifested by different types of containers has not been entirely put to rest
outside the area of the automobile exception.
III. CONCLUSION
In Texas v. Brown the Supreme Court held that a police officer's prob-
able cause to believe that an object is contraband or evidence of criminal
activity is sufficient to support the immediately apparent requirement of
the plain view doctrine enunciated in Coolidge v. New Hampshire. A po-
lice officer's suspicion, based on his knowledge and experience in light of
surrounding circumstances, may give rise to the requisite probable cause.
Although the Court confirmed the significance of the warrant clause in
assuring protection from unreasonable search and seizure and clarified the
immediately apparent element of the plain view doctrine, it cast doubt on
the viability of the Coolidge formulation of the plain view doctrine as a
separate exception to the warrant requirement. The future of the inadver-
tence requirement remains unclear.
Marian Spitzberg
132. 456 U.S. 798 (1982).
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